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Over the last four months, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has been the subject of 
endless criticism over his alleged involvement in the murder of journalist Georgy 
Gongadze. The European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, Reporters Without 
Borders, and Human Rights Watch are just a few of the organizations that have strongly 
condemned President Kuchma since recordings were released purporting to contain a 
conversation in which Kuchma indirectly suggested that Gongadze be eliminated. The 
EU has called the presidential administration's heavy-handed response to protests over 
the Gongadze issue "a test of the democratic development of Ukraine,"(1) while 
governments throughout the world have tied continued aid to a satisfactory resolution of 
the case.(2)
Meanwhile, those same governments have remained remarkably silent about two other 
issues facing Ukraine -- the eradication of Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko's 
government and the withering of GUUAM. The silence comes even though the fallout 
from these issues could be much broader and more long-range than the fallout from 
Kuchma's alleged involvement in the death of Gongadze. Still, Western organizations 
and governments cling to their credo of 2001: "Ukraine must deal with the Gongadze 
issue before the West will assist it in dealing with anything else."
In Ukraine's case, "anything else" is quite a lot. Ukraine has been one of the primary 
beneficiaries of Western support over the last decade. Still, despite progress, the 
country remains one of the poorest in Europe, and one of the most threatened by 
Russia's continuing infatuation with the idea of a reconstituted union of former Soviet 
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states. For this reason, the West's position is extremely short-sighted (even given the 
seriousness of the accusations against Kuchma and his associates), and runs the very 
clear risk of increasing Ukraine's vulnerability to Russian pressure.
Ukraine, for all its flaws, continues to possess remarkable potential both as a link to Asia 
and as a regional leader. In the last couple of years, it seemed that some of this 
potential finally was beginning to be realized. For the first time, the country achieved 
GNP growth in FY2000. The Yushchenko government attempted to reduce the shadow 
economy, institute land reform, pay internal wage arrears and international debts, and 
improve the investment climate. In addition, Ukraine had been taking a definitive, if 
cautious, lead position within GUUAM, the informal organization linking Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. Joint solutions to a number of difficult 
regional problems seemed a possibility. But as Western organizations wait for the 
resolution of the Gongadze affair, the government responsible for achieving Ukraine's 
first-ever economic growth was allowed to fall, and GUUAM has ceased to function at 
its highest levels.
Because of their preoccupation with Gongadze, Western organizations have lost 
Ukraine's most reform-oriented government and may soon also lose a regional 
organization that could provide a major service to both Western Europe and Eurasia. It 
was the Yushchenko government, after all, that attempted to reduce the shadow 
economy, institute land reform, pay internal wage arrears and international debts, and 
improve the investment climate. It has been GUUAM that has attempted to provide 
Western Europe with an alternative oil source and to deal with the numerous 
destabilizing separatist movements throughout the area.
But now, GUUAM is balancing on the brink, and the Yushchenko government is gone. 
Active support for GUUAM might still save it from succumbing to the same fate as 
Yushchenko's government. Active support for Yushchenko (who should have been 
viewed as distinct from Kuchma's administration) would have gone a long way toward 
helping Yushchenko continue his work and would have preserved the small but 
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significant progress Ukraine has made recently on the road to a Western-style economy. 
But instead, at the Stockholm EU summit, leaders seemingly chose to ignore a plea for 
support from Yushchenko as he fought to keep his position.
Yushchenko Loses the Battle
When the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, voted to dismiss Viktor Yushchenko's 
government (which appeared quite likely as this issue went to press), it came as no 
surprise to anyone. The prime minister had received some breathing space thanks to an 
agreement with parliament that his government would not be dismissed during the past 
year. That agreement, part of Yushchenko's comprehensive "Reforms for Well-Being" 
economic program, expired in early April. Despite the fact that most experts view the 
program as a success, the Rada found it to be unsatisfactory. With that, Ukraine's 
reformist government was removed in favor of one likely to be more interested in 
preserving the power of the president and individual businessmen (the "oligarchs") than 
in instituting necessary reform measures.
The crisis that toppled Yushchenko obviously involved much more than the success or 
failure of an economic program. It involved the realization of parliamentarians that the 
balance was shifting in their favor, and their mad dash to grab as much power as 
possible before the next parliamentary elections. More importantly, several "oligarchs" 
apparently believe that now is the time to rid themselves of the man who has worked to 
limit their influence. A coalition between the oligarch parties and the communists -- the 
largest party in parliament -- could create the most left-leaning government since the 
country's independence.
Yushchenko had suggested that his cabinet was willing to sign an agreement with the 
parliamentary majority in order to "formally establish relations," but that majority has 
disintegrated under the weight of the Gongadze scandal. Yushchenko no longer could 
look to right and centrist political parties to support him automatically against his 
opponents; the parties were apparently too concerned with using the scandal to further 
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their own purposes. Yushchenko's only hope seemed to be his supporters in the West. 
"One reason for keeping him on," an Economist article suggested, "is to provide a figleaf 
of credibility to foreigners."(3) This fact may have prompted Yushchenko's indirect but 
obvious plea for support from Western leaders ahead of the EU summit.
Just days before the summit began, Yushchenko announced unexpectedly that the 
Ukrainian section of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and the Yuzhnyy oil terminal near 
Odessa were 90 percent complete. By the end of 2001, he said, Ukraine will be able to 
function as a transit country for Caspian oil to Western Europe. This year alone, he 
suggested, the pipeline and terminal could handle "twelve million tons of oil."(4)
If only the Europeans were interested. Unfortunately, there are no commercial backers 
for this Ukrainian-Polish pipeline project, which would constitute the final leg of an 
Asian-Caucasus-European oil transit corridor running between Azerbaijan and Poland. 
Ukraine's economic woes, combined with sharp Russian opposition to any pipeline that 
bypasses its territory, have limited the project's support among Western European 
governments and corporations.
Yushchenko's announcement, however, was an obvious opportunity for European 
representatives to support one of the prime minister's most ambitious projects. Doing 
so, even in the most cautious and indirect fashion, would have provided Yushchenko 
with a badly needed victory in advance of the vote of no confidence in his government. 
Expressing support for Yushchenko's program of Western orientation (as a separate 
matter from the Kuchma-Gongadze affair) would have done even more. Yet world 
leaders at the EU summit chose to do neither, individually or as a group. This decision 
left Yushchenko on the edge.(5)
The decision seemingly also condemned GUUAM, an institution that the EU should, by 
all rights, be supporting. It is an organization that could provide EU members with a 
stable new source of oil and gas, and might serve also as a springboard for 
independent economic growth in the Eurasian region.
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GUUAM Battles to Survive
Yushchenko's prized Azerbaijan-Poland oil transit corridor is just one project under the 
umbrella of the TRACECA transportation project funded partially by the European 
Union.(6) The project, which envisions ferry, rail, motor and energy pipeline links 
between the countries of the Caspian and Black Sea areas and Western Europe, 
originally found great support among Western organizations and leaders. It also served 
as one of the incentives for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova to form GUAM in 
October of 1997: These countries quickly realized that their interests were similar not 
only on this issue, but on many others as well.(7) Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze explained the organization's purpose very simply. "GUUAM is an 
association of states with equal rights," he said, "determined to solve problems facing 
them by pooled efforts and consulting each other."(8)
Shevardnadze's statement, however, does little justice to the true goals and potential of 
GUUAM. The problems they aim to solve are massive, but before Ukraine became 
embroiled in the Gongadze scandal, the group had indeed managed to make progress.
Ukrainian analyst Taras Kuzio formulated 10 major objectives that "link the five countries 
of GUUAM in a strategic alliance," including (a) the "wish to oppose the dominant role of 
Russia," (b) creation of an alternative to the CIS for resolution of ethnic conflicts within 
the region, and (c) prevention of "the use of economic levers by Russia to obtain 
strategic objectives."(9) Each of these goals, if accomplished, would add a pluralistic, 
stable, democratic aspect to a region of the world that has long operated under other 
standards. Elin Suleymanov, First Secretary of Political Affairs for the Embassy of 
Azerbaijan, explained: "The fact that it's voluntary is critical," he said. "No one told us. 
We decided it."(10)
Even before Uzbekistan joined the alliance, it announced one of TRACECA's first 
achievements. On 25 November 1998, the country opened a terminal to export cotton 
by rail and tanker to Western Europe through Georgia. The goal of the route was "to 
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[move] the trend away from traditional export routes via Russia," thereby saving on 
various fees and taxes and creating a more independent economic base.(11) By early 
1999, the number of accomplishments mounted. A Georgian army platoon was created 
using Ukrainian equipment in order to "guard pipelines." This action coincided with the 
opening of the Baku-Supsa section of the TRACECA pipeline, and the inauguration of a 
rail link connecting Poti in Georgia to Ilyichevsk in Ukraine. At the time, President 
Kuchma remained an ardent supporter of GUUAM and the TRACECA project, and 
noted that the rail link and the pipeline were "more significant geopolitically" than they 
seemed. "Oil is life," he suggested, "as well as a powerful foundation for a nation's 
development and well-being. It is the backbone of national security."(12)
GUUAM's activities were not limited to TRACECA. There was a major effort, in 
particular by Georgia, to use the alliance to end the numerous separatist rebellions in 
the region. For this purpose, there was talk of creating a joint peacekeeping battalion. 
As such, Ukraine offered to send peacekeepers to Abkhazia in Georgia, but only under 
the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Currently, Russian troops are continuing what they call 
a peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia under the guise of the CIS. Since Russia has 
steadfastly refused any suggestion that CIS troops be replaced by UN or OSCE troops 
-- thereby removing Moscow's influence in the area -- the proposal has gone nowhere. 
GUUAM members have held joint military exercises, concluded a number of military 
cooperation agreements, and planned to institute a free trade zone, however.
A number of countries, most particularly Romania and Bulgaria, were so impressed that 
they indicated a willingness to consider joining the grouping. And on 1 July 2000, then-
Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk unveiled Ukraine's plan to institutionalize the group, 
making it a formal alliance.
How quickly things can change. Soon after Tarasyuk's plan was unveiled, Russia 
ratcheted up the pressure on its neighbor. Vladimir Putin was obviously disturbed by the 
attempt to create a regional unit independent of its old master. Meanwhile, both 
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Yushchenko and Tarasyuk's increasing popularity served as an irritant to Kuchma, who 
was looking to consolidate his hold on power even further. It was a perfect bargain. 
Kuchma fired his West-oriented foreign minister, ridding himself of a rival and receiving 
favorable agreements from Putin regarding Ukraine's gas debts. Tarasyuk was then 
replaced with the more pro-Russian Anatoly Zlenko. It was the beginning of the end for 
Kuchma's support of GUUAM.
The Gongadze scandal soon isolated Kuchma, causing him to depend even more 
deeply on Putin. In an interview with Ukrayina Moloda, Tarasyuk put it bluntly: "It is 
precisely because of pressure from Russia that there has been a change in Ukraine's 
strategic course. We no longer use the term 'Euro-Atlantic integration.'"(13) And it is 
undoubtedly because of Kuchma's bargain with Putin that the Ukrainian president 
seemingly has backed away from his promise to host a GUUAM presidential summit.
In February, the countries of GUUAM announced that their upcoming summit -- 
scheduled for 6-7 March -- would be postponed indefinitely. Of course, Ukraine does not 
constitute the only reason for the postponement. The recent communist victory in 
Moldova has called into question that country's membership in the group,(14) and 
Uzbekistan has begun to avoid GUUAM meetings in return for Russia's "protection" 
from "Islamic extremists." Clearly, what Oleksandr Pavliuk has called Russia's "carrot 
and stick" approach to the countries of GUUAM has been successful to some extent. By 
pressuring each country in a different way, Russia has been able to damage GUUAM's 
cohesion. But, not until the last several months has the tactic worked with Ukraine, and 
not until the last several months has the GUUAM alliance seemed in danger of 
dissolving.
Most GUUAM observers have suggested that the loss of Moldova and Uzbekistan does 
not necessarily constitute a death blow for the group. But piece by piece, the countries 
of GUUAM seem to be returning to Russia's hold. And the recent eastward shift of 
Ukraine is an ominous sign for the stability of the region.
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Orest Deychakiwsky, a staff advisor for the US Congressional Commission for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), suggested, "The problem in GUUAM now is that 
Ukraine has become much more vulnerable to [Russian] pressure lately, and this 
causes a problem for the association."(15) A high-ranking Georgian diplomat went 
further. "Because of the internal situation in Ukraine," he said, "[the country] is becoming 
weaker," which could "affect even the existence of GUUAM."(16)
With only limited Ukrainian support, GUUAM's survival is possible, but unlikely. And 
without GUUAM, the one counterweight to Russian economic and political dominance 
over the CIS area would be removed. Even more importantly, Russia would remain the 
dominant military power, acting as "peacekeeper" within the CIS, patrolling areas of 
conflict (reportedly incited by its own troops) and continuing to allow instability to rule. 
Without the possibility of a regional, stabilizing peacekeeping force, the separatist areas 
within Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova will continue to seethe. Europe will continue to 
experience a series of small civil wars, and the one organization with the possibility to 
stop them will have dissolved.
Viktor Yushchenko stood as the one man in Ukraine committed and in a position to 
maintain Ukraine's pro-western and pro-reformist course, including the country's 
leadership in GUUAM. But Europe's leaders chose not to support the prime minister 
against his anti-Western opponents. An important opportunity has been lost. However, 
the opportunity does still exist for Western leaders to express their support for the 
continuation of the projects supported by GUUAM. To do so may help sustain the first 
voluntary grouping of independent states on the area of the former Soviet Union and 
continue the process of solving some of the region's most difficult political problems.
Notes:
(1) Anna Lindh, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and member of the EU Troika, "EU 
Statement on the media situation in Ukraine," 15 February 2001. [Publication? 
Website?]
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(2) The United States is a notable exception, despite comments to the contrary. 
Although US Department of State Spokesman Richard Boucher suggested that "our 
ability to help [the Ukrainians] in the future depends on their willingness to abide by the 
constitution, abide by their commitments to the rule of law," in fact the US has 
announced quietly what amounts to an increase in aid for the coming year.
(3) The Economist, 10 March 2001.
(4) Interfax, 13 March 2001; FBIS-SOV-2001-0313.
(5) Once again, the US is an exception. US Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual 
recently met with Yushchenko about the pipeline, offering cautious encouragement and 
the possibility that the US will assist Ukraine in opening negotiations with oil companies 
about the project.
(6) TRACECA stands for Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia.
(7) Another major incentive was the (unsuccessful) attempt to oppose Western 
concessions to Russia over Conventional Forces Treaty flank limits. "GUAM" became 
"GUUAM" in 1999, when Uzbekistan joined the group.
(8) ITAR-TASS, 22 June 1999; FBIS-SOV-1999-0632.
(9) Taras Kuzio, "Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM," 
European Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 94.
(10) Interview with author, 15 March 2001.
(11) Interfax, 25 November 1998.
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(12) Interfax, 1112 and 1318 GMT, 17 April 1998; FBIS-SOV-1999-0417.
(13) Ukrayina Moloda, 21 February 2001; FBIS-SOV-2001-0307.
(14) Instead, the country may be interested in membership in the Russia-Belarus (and 
unofficially Armenia) Union. Membership in the union was one of newly elected 
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin's main campaign promises. Although Voronin 
seems to be backing away slightly from his promise, a Russia-Belarus-Armenia-
Moldova Union still remains a significant possibility.
(15) Interview with author, 20 March 2001.
(16) Interview with author, 21 March 2001.
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